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THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF EVIDENCE
(Continued)
By LEO H. WHINERY*
In the last installment the meaning of proof, burden of persuasion,
burden of producing evidence and finding of fact in the Uniform
Rules was considered.' Changes in some of the Rules were sug-
gested and the Rules, with the modifications, were compared with
North Dakota law. The terminology and definitions in the Rules,
with these modifications, will be applied in continuing the discus-
sion. No other area of the law of evidence seems quite so plagued
with ambiguity, misunderstanding and disagreement than burden of
proof and presumptions. A good deal of this is attributable to the
laxity of the courts in the use and explanation of terminology in de-
ciding matters of proof pertaining to the trial process. Some at-
tention was drawn to this problem in ths previous installment and
there will be occasion to consider it further in succeeding pages. In
the meantime, it is important to emphasize the importance of con-
sistency in terminology and meaning even though there may be
disagreement with the views set forth.
III. The Theory and Application of Proof in the Trial Process
A fundamental principle of Anglo-American litigation is that the
parties-litigant are responsible for informing the court of the mat-
ters of fact which constitute the basis of the dispute and for proving
the existence or non-existence of such propositions of fact as will
bring one or the other of them within a rule of law entitling him to
a judgment.2 At the pleading stage the parties develop the proposi-
tions of fact in dispute and thereby inform the court of the issues to
be decided.3 Similarly, at the trial stage, the court and trier of fact,
though informed of the propositions of fact in dispute, know noth-
ing of their existence or non-existence. Further, and though there
are exceptions, the court and trier of fact do not ordinarily have the
means for making such a determination.4
Proof, it has been suggested in the previous installment, should
be defined in Uniform Rule 1(3) to mean "the cumulative effect of
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
1. Whinery, Burden of Proof, 33 NDL Rev. 203 (1958).
2. A more detailed discussion of this principle of party presentation will be found in
Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 Il. L. Rev. 1, 16 et seq. (1923).
See also, 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2483 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Meckle v. Hoffman, 78 N.W.2d 166 (N.D. 1956); Reitman v. Whitaker, 74 N.D.
504, 23 N.W.2d 393 (1946). See also, Clark, Code Pleading § 1 (1947).
4. See Lindberg v. Burton, 41 N.D. 587, 171 N.W. 616, 618 (1919).
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all the evidence relevant to a fact in issue which persuades the
trier of fact of the existence or non-existence of such fact."'  Since
proof is the responsibility of the parties and the determinate of proof
is both the evidence and its persuasive effect,' it necessarily follows
that one or the other of the parties, during the course of the trial,
will have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion as
defined in Uniform Rules 1(5) and 1(4 ', irrespective of whether
the trial is a jury case or a non-jury case with the judge as the trier
of fact."
First, assuming a jury trial, as to each disputed proposition of
fact, the party who will ultimately have the burden of persuasion is
the one upon whom the burden of producing evidence first falls
since, without evidence there can be no persuasion, without which
there is no proof. He may be either the plaintiff or defendant de-
pending upon how the burden of persuasion is allocated. We will
refer to him as the proponent. In terms of the foregoing definition
of proof, the proponent must see to it that evidence of sufficient
quantity and quality has been introduced which, at least, may per-
suade the trier of fact of the existence or non-existence of the dis-
puted fact.
What is the test for determining whether the proponent has met
this burden of producing evidence under Uniform Rule 1(5)? The
Rule does not specify. Conversely, the Model Code provides that
the burden of producing evidence is aischarged when sufficient
evidence has been introduced to support a finding that the fact
exists. 10 Consideration should be given to modifying Uniform Rule
1(5) accordingly. As modified, however, there would be no signi-
ficant change in North Dakota law. The Supreme Court has held
that the test is "whether there is any competent evidence in the case
reasonably tending to sustain" the fact sought to be proved.1 As-
5. Whinery, supra note 1, at 207.
6. See Uniform Rule 1 (1) defining "evidence" as "the means from which inferences
may be drawn as a basis of proof in duly constituted judicial or fact-finding tribunals .... "
7. Uniform Rule 1(5) provides; " 'Burden of producing evidence' means the obligation
of a party to introduce evidence when necessary to avoid the risk of a directed verdict or
peremptory finding against him on a material issue of fact." It has been recommended
that Uniform Rule 1(4) provide: " 'Burden of Persuasion' means the obligation of a party
to meet the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved either by a prepond-
erance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt,
as the case may be." See Whinery, supra note 1, at 206. For the rule as recommended
by the Conference, see page 203.
8. See Uniform Rule 1(11) defining "trier of fact" to include "a jury and a judge
when he is trying an issue of fact other than one relating to the admissibility of evidence."
9. See Whinery, supra note 1, at 205-206.
10. Model Code of Evidence, rule 1(2) provides: "'Burden of producing evidence of
a fact' means the burden which is discharged when sufficient evidence is introduced to sup-
port a finding that the facts exists."
11. Cameron v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 8 N.D. 124, 77 N.W. 1016 (1898). See also,
Schnoor v. Meinecke, 77 N.D. 96, 40 N.W.2d 803 (1950). North Dakota thus follows
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suming there is, the proponent has established -if, according to
Wigmore, the term is correctly used - a prima facie case.12 And
the term has been so used by the North Dakota court,'2 ' though, as
we shall see later, it has by no means been confined to mean in-
troducing just enough evidence to get to the jury on an issue of fact.
If the proponent fails to meet this burden of producing evidence,
the evidence will not persuade and there is no issue of fact for the
jury to determine. In these circumstances, the court would be re-
quired to direct a verdict or make a peremptory finding against the
proponent. While this capacity of the court to dispose of the issue
by a directed verdict or peremptory finding applies irrespective of
whether the trial is with a judge or jury as trier of fact, its con-
sequences are most significant in the jury trial. Taking the case from
the jury is based on common law doctrine which, on the one hand,
requires the court to control and supervise the jury process to insure
rational results in fact-finding and, on the other, gives to the jury
the responsibility to decide issues of fact. 14 This gives rise to two
corollary rules of law. First, if the evidence will only permit one
reasonable conclusion, the question of fact is to be determined by
the court as a question of law. Second, but if the evidence is of
such a nature that different minds might reasonably draw different
conclusions therefrom, the question of fact must be submitted to the
jury.'
Second, assume, however, that propouent has met his burden of
producing evidence and the mass of cvidence may, though not
necessarily, persuade. The persuasive effect of the evidence is equi-
vocal and an issue of fact arises which must be determined by the
jury. It is still possible that the evidence will or will not persuade
the jury that the fact does or does not exist. But suppose it has
neither consequence and the mind of the jury is left in a state of
uncertainty. The equilibrium is removed by requiring that the pro-
ponent, considering the evidence as a whole, shall have persuaded
the majority, though the test is formulated in varying ways in different jurisdictions. A few
states adhere to the so-called "scintilla rule", that is, any evidence at all will take the
case to the jury [See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940)], which the North Dakota
Supreme Court has specifically rejected. See Schnoor v. Meinecke, supra.
12. 9 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 11.
13. Schnoor v. Meinecke, 77 N.D. 96, 40 N.W.2d 803 (1950).
14. See, for example, the North Dakota case of Fuller v. Northern Pac. Elevator Co., 2
N.D. 220, 50 N.W. 359 (1891): "It is not the duty of any court, nor has it the right, to
close its eyes to obvious facts. Courts were instituted to promote justice, and not to per-
petuate error. A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, but it should
say whether or not the judgment of the jury has been fairly exercised, or whether or not
the result shows unmistakable prejudice, or a disregard of the evidence submitted." For a
thorough analysis of this point, see Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 207-253
(1898).
15. Thompson v. Hannah Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 79 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1956);
Fuller v. Northern Pac. Elevator Co., 2 N.D. 220, 50 N.W. 359 (1891).
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the jury that the fact does or does not exist by a preponderance of
the evidence (more probable than not), clear and convincing evi-
dence (highly probable), or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case
may be.1 6 If the proponent does not so persuade and destroy the
equilibrium then there is no proof as heretofore defined.
Suppose, however, that the proponent, in meeting his burden of
producing evidence, does more than just establish a prima facie
case; suppose he introduces evidence of such a nature that no
reasonable mind could fail to be persuaded that the fact exists.
Under these circumstances, the burden of producing evidence
would then shift to the opponent and unless he introduces evidence
which, when considered with that already introduced, may have the
opposite persuasive effect, the proponent would be entitled to a
directed verdict under Uniform Rule I15), based upon the same
general considerations which enable the court to take the case from
the jury for the failure of proponent to rrieet his burden of produc-
ing evidence.
The foregoing has been predicated upon the introduction of evi-
dence to shift the burden of producing evidence to the opponent
under threat of a directed verdict. Ancther method by which the
proponent can accomplish- this is, in appropriate cases, by resorting
to the use of the presumption, depending, of course, as we shall see,
upon how one defines a presumption. And, depending upon the
particular jurisdiction's rules governing the effect of presumptions,
use of the presumption may also have another distinct advantage,
allocating the burden of persuasion.
PRESUMPTIONS
I. Definition and Rationale
In General. Irrespective of its propriety, or utility, the conclus-
ion is inescapable that courts generally, including the Supreme
Court of North Dakota, have used the word "presumption" pri-
marily to denote a relationship between two kinds of facts, com-
monly referred to as the basic fact and the presumed fact. When-
ever the existence of fact B (.basic fact) is established, either for
reasons of logic or policy, the existence of fact P (presumed fact)
will be presumed. While this is clear enough, the word "presump-
tion" as descriptive of this relationship possesses the vice of gen-
erality and is misleading because the establishment of such a rela-
tionship will lead to different results depending upon the different
legal consequences which, due to statute or judicial decision, must
16. See Whinery, supra note 1 ,at 207 et seq.
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follow because of the nature of and/or the reasons for the particular
relationship. To illustrate, several possibilities must be considered.'( "
First, the term "presumption" has been used as synonomous with
justifiable inference, that is, where the existence of the presumed
fact can be logically deduced from proof, of the basic fact. In West-
Land Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' 7 a Federal diversity
case arising in North Dakota, plaintiff sought to show that a fire
started by the sparking of a switch in a pump house which ignited
gasoline overflowing from an adjacent storage tank. The plaintiff
introduced no direct evidence of the cause of the fire, but did show
that an employee of the plaintiff was in the pump house when the
fire started, that the employee had received no notice from the de-
fendant that the gasoline tank was full and that overflowing gaso-
line would run into the pump house. From this, plaintiff argued, it
could be inferred that the fire started from the sparking of a switch
when the employee attempted to stop thc pump. In affirming the
direction of a verdict for the defendant, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals said:
"An inference of negligence must be based on a logical relation
and connection between the proven facts or circumstances and
the concluson sought to be adduced from them. The circumstances
must themselves be proved and cannot be presumed. * * * Be-
fore inferring that the fire was caused by a spark from the turn-
ing off of the switch, there would at least have to be evidence
that the switch was in fact turned off. A presumption must be
based upon facts proven by direct evidence and cannot be based
upon nor inferred from another presumption."'
Or, second, one will find the word "presumption" used in the
decisions where, though there is no logical connection between the
basic fact and the presumed fact, establishment of the basic fact
authorizes the trier of fact to find the presumed fact. This has been
described by Professor McCormick as a "permissive presumption." 9
By some this apparently characterizes res ispa loquitur on the ground
that the doctrine is based on the policy that the defendant has
greater access to the facts and circumstances of negligence or due
16a. See Morgan, Maguire & Weinstein, Cases and Materials on Evidence 438-439 (4th
ed. 1957).
17.. 143 F.2d 326. (8th Cir. 1944).
18. Id. at 330. On the question of whether an inference can be based upon another
inference, see New York Life Insurance Co. v. McNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 P.2d 948 (1938)
where the court said: ". . . the courts do not mean that under no circumstances may an
inference be drawn from an inference, but rather that the prior inferences must be estab-
lished to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory rather than merely by a probability,
in order that the last inference of the probability of the ultimate fact may be based thereon."
Id. at 955. In the Westland Oil Co. case the Court said: "It would be necessary to infer
(1 )that Dippong in fact turned off the switch; (2) that a spark was emitted from the
switch when it was turned off; and (3) that the spark ignited the gasoline."
19. McCormick, Law of Evidence 640 (1954).
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care.20 But, in any event, evidence that the plaintiff was injured in
an accident involving an instrumentality within the control of the
defendant, that the accident would not have occurred in the ordin-
ary course of events if proper care had been used and that the
injury was not due to a voluntary act of the plaintiff only takes the
case to the jury from which it may find that defendant was negli-
gent. In this sense it does nothing more than create a prima facie
case of negligence through the use of circumstantial, rather than
direct evidence. A majority of the courts thus hold that the doctrine,
when applicable, is nothing more than a rule of evidence which
gives the trier of fact, based on principles of logic, the right to
infer the negligence of the defendant.21 Based on logic, not policy,
it is nothing more than illustrative of the "justifiable inference"
previously discussed. Dean Prosser has commented as follows:
"Courts frequently have said and occasionally have held that
the doctrine cannot be applied unless evidence of the true.explan-
ation of the accident is more accessible to the defendant than to
the plaintiff. It is difficult to regard this factor as anything more
than a makeweight, or to believe that it can ever be controlling.
If the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable inference
of negligence, it cannot be supposed that the inference ever
would be defeated by a showing that the defendant knew nothing
about what had happened; and if the facts give rise to no such
inference, a plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first in-
stance could scarcely make out a case merely by proving that he
knew less about the matter than his adversary."
22
There is, however, in North Dakota at least, authority which charac-
terizes res ipsa loquitur as a "presumption of negligence" 23 and
which takes the case to the jury, even though there is no logical
connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact. In Liefer-
man v. White, with a strong dissent, the majority approved send-
ing the case to the jury under res ipsa loquitur on proof of the
happening of the accident alone.24 The Court talks in terms of res
ipas loquitur as nothing more than a species of circumstantial evi-
dence, but it certainly does not so apply to the doctrine..
2 5
The legislature may also provide, by statute, that a finding of
20. See Morgan, Maguire & Weinstein, Cases and Materials on Evidence 438 (4th ed.
1957).
21. Prosser, Law of Torts § 42 (1955).
22. Id. at page 209.
23. See Wyldes v. Patterson, 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915); see also, the dis-
senting opinion in Leiferman v. White, 40 N.D. 150, 168 N.W. 569 (1918).
24. See note 23 supra.
25. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 19, at page 205, where the author states: "The in-
jury must be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was
responsible, or it must be shown that he was responsible for all reasonably probable causes
to which the accident could be attributed."
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the basic fact authorizes a finding of the presumed fact because of
fairness or convenience, even though the principles of logic would
not warrant such a result. In State v. Nomberg'2 6 the defendants
were tried and convicted under an information charging them with
maintaining a common nuisance. The State introduced in evidence
a United States government license for the sale of malt liquor pur-
suant to a statute providing that such should be "prima facie evi-
dence" of the charge. The trial court instructed the jury to the effect
that possession of the license was conclusive proof of the charge un-
less explained by the defendants by other evidence. In reversing
the conviction, the Supreme Court said:
"This statute, in declaring that the possession of the license
shall be prima facie evidence, means 'that such evidence is comp-
etent and sufficient to justify a jury in finding a defendant guilty,
provided it does in fact satisfy them of his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, and not otherwise.' . .. 'These statutes . .. do not
raise a conclusive presumption against the defendant. It is error
to instruct the jury that they must find him guilty on proof of
such facts alone, for such evidence is competent and sufficient to
justify a verdict only if, the jury are satisfied of defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.' "27
Third, a finding of the basic fact giving rise to the presumed
fact may also require that the trier of fact find according to the
presumed fact unless the party against whom the presumption
operates meets certain conditions, described by Professor McCorm-
ick as a "mandatory presumption." 28 It is in this sense and this
sense only that Thayer,2 0 Wigmore, ° the Model Code,'31 and the
Uniform Rules 2 say the word "presumption" can be applied. And,
by statute in North Dakota, presumption is so defined. Section 31-
1103 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 provides:
"All presumptions other than those set forth in section 31-1102
[denominated conclusive presumptions] are satisfactory if uncon-
tradicted. They are denominated disputable presumptions and
may be contradicted by other evidence."
One might legitimately ask what is meant by the language "are satis-
factory if uncontradicted," but, when this section is construed in
pari materia with Section 31-1101, providing that jurors are bound
to find according to the presumption unless controverted by other
26. 14 N.D. 291, 103 N.W. 566 (1905).
27. Id. at page 567.
28. McCormick, Law of Evidence 640 (1954).
29. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 317, 321, 326 (1898).
30. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2940 (3d ed. 1940).
31. Model Code, of Evidence, rule 701 (1942).
32. See page 20 infra.
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evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that the "disputable pre-
sumption" defined in Section 31-1103 is provisionally mandatory."3
Section 31-1103 sets out forty different presumptions, among these
being the well known ones that official duty has been performed
regularly,3 4 a letter duly addressed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail,3- a person not heard from in seven years
is dead,3 r and a thing once found to exist continues as long as is
usual with things of that nature.3 7 The statute certainly does not
purport to be exclusive. There are a number of other statutes
creating presumptions, for example, the presumption of legit-
imacy,zs  in addition to those recognized by judicial decision, such
as the presumption against suicide.39
The express language of Section 31-1103 would lead one to be-
lieve that the word "presumption" is confined to the basic fact-
presumed fact relationship which is of a provisionally mandatory
nature. Are the presumptions created independent of the enactment
of Section 81-1103 all of this type? Some certainly are. For example,
Section 36-2112 of the Code provides that the "killing of any live-
stock by a railroad car or locomotive shall be prima facie evi-
dence of carelessness and negligence on the part of the railway
company or corporation." This statute has been construed as creat-
ing a presumption of negligence, mandatory in nature,40 and resting
for its validity on the theory that the person who has superior
knowledge of the facts relating to the question of negligence should
prove them.41 Yet, on the other hand, we have observed that the
33. See Foster v. National Tea Co., 74 N.D. 37, 19 N.W.2d 760 (1954); 'Schell v.
Collis, 83 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1957); Anderson v. First Nat. Bank of Grand Forks, 6
N.D. 497, 72 N.W. 916 (1897), aff'd on other grounds, 172 U.S. 573 (1899). For a
detailed discussion of Section 31-1101, see page 29 infra.
34. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1103, subd. 15 (1943).
35. Id. at subd. 24. Cf. Kvale v. Keane, 39 N.D. 560, 168 N.W. 74 (1918).
36. Id. at subd. 26
3-7. Id. at subd. 31. The extent to which a legislature can go in creating presumptions
is a study in itself. Professor McCormick has summarized and analyzed the various ap-
proaches to this question ably. See McCormick, Law of Evidence § 313 (1954). But
briefly, they are the Wigrore view that, subject only to constitutional limitations, the legis-
lature can go as far as it desires in creating presumptions; the "rational connection" test,
i. e., some rational connection must exist between the basic fact and the presumed fact;
"the greater includes the less" test, i. e., where -the presumption effectuates a result which
would not be beyond the power of the legislature to impose directly; the test which
measures the validity of the presumption by the effect which it is given; and the test of
whether the defendant has a superior access to the proof. Professor McCormick directs
attention to which one of these tests ought to determine the limitations on legislative
creation of presumptions, carefully distinguishing between criminal and civil cases and
concludes that the Supreme Court went too far in Tot v. United States and United States
v. Delia, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), two criminal cases, in adopting the "rational connection"
test.
38. N.D. Rev. Code J§ 14-0901-14-0903 (1943).
39. See Svikovec v. Woodmen Ace. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939); Also,
Edwardson v. Gerwein, 41 N.D. 506, 171 N.W. 101 (1919) (presumption of sanity).
40. Snyder v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 69 N.D. 266, 285 N.W. 450- (1939).
41. Corbett v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 19 N.D. 450, 125 N.W. 1054 (1910).
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word "presumption" has also been applied to the other two types
of relationships heretofore discussed.
Finally, the word "presumption" is used to describe the result
reached where, upon a finding of the basic fact, the presumed fact
must irrevocably be assumed. This is the so-called "conclusive pre-
sumption" which is recognized in North Dakota by Section 31-1102
of the Code. It is submitted however, that there is no such thing.
Wigmore's analysis will suffice. He says:
"In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive
presumption.' Wherever from one fact another is said to be co-
clusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely
precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact
does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the first
fact is shown to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly im-
material for the purpose of the proponent's case; and to provide
this is to make a rule of substantive law and not a rule apport-
ioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or
varying the duty of coming forward with evidence." 2
In summary, it would seem that the justifiable inference has no
place in the category of presumptions, notwithstanding its similarity
with presumptions in terms of the basic fact-presumed fact rela-
tionship described at the outset of this section. An inference is a
matter of logic; not a matter of law."3 In each of the three succeed-
ing situations discussed, the basic fact-presumed fact relationship
arises as a matter of law - by statute or judicial decision - either
because the particular relationship is inherently probable, such as
the presumption that official duty has been performed regularly;
44 it
affords procedural convenience, such as the presumption of sanity;
45
it places the burden first producing evidence on the party who has
superior access to the evidence, such as the statutory presumption
of negligence arising from the killing or damaging of stock by a
railway company;4 or it effects desired social and economic poli-
cies, such as the presumption that a person not heard from in seven
years is dead.4 1 In consequence, when the problem is one of draw-
ing inferences from circumstantial evidence, the courts ought not
to be talking in terms of "presumption," except in those instances,
42.'9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2492 (3rd ed. 1940).
43. See Gausewitz, Presumptions in -a One-Rule World, 5 Van. L. Rev. 324, 326
(1952).
44. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1103, subd. 15 (1943). See McCormick, Law of Evidence
641 (1954).
45. See Edwardson v. Gerwien, 41 N.D. 506, 171 N.W. 101 (1919); also, McCormick,
Law of Evidence 641 (1954).
46. N.D. Rev. Code J 36-2112 1943). Corbett v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 19 N.D.
450, 125 N.W. 1054 (1910). See also, McCormick, Law of Evidence 641 (1964).
47. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-1103, subd. 26 (1943). See McCormick, Law of Evidence
641 (1954).
1961]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
where the recurrence of the basic fact-presumed fact relationship
has, because of its inherent probability, been accorded the status
of a presumption.
It is true, as between the justifiable inference and the permissive
presumption, both have the effect of taking the case to the jury or,
what we have heretofore described as creating a prima facie case. 8
Notwithstanding this similarity, the former arises as a matter of
logic; the latter as a matter of law. For this reason, the two ought
not to be confused with one another by using a generic term to
describe both.
As between the permissive presumption and mandatory presump-
tion we find both a similarity in the basic fact-presumed fact
relationship and in the origin of that relationship in a rule of law.
They do differ in one respect, that is, the permissive presumption
will permit the trier to find the presumed fact, or, in other words,
create a prima facie case, while the mandatory presumption would
compel a finding of the presumed fact except upon fulfillment of
certain conditions by the party against whom the mandatory pre-
sumption operates. However, the use of the term "prima facie evi-
dence" as characterizing the result of a permissive presumption is
not free of ambiguity under North Dakota law. Recall the Nomberg
case interpreting the term "prima facie evidence" in the applicable
statute to mean the same thing as a permissive presumption."8
Conversely, consider Section 36-2112 of the Code which provides
that the "killing or damaging of any livestock by a railroad car or
locomotive shall be prima facie evidence of carelessness and negli-
gence on the part of the railway company or corporation." This
statute has been construed as creating a mandatory presumption
of negligence.50 For this reason, the qualifying terminology suggest-
ed by Professor McCormick might prove extremely helpful in dis-
tinguishing these two different basic facts - presumed fact rela-
tionships.
The Uniform Rule Definition and North Dakota Law. The Uni-
form Rules, following Thayer, Wigmore, and the Model Code, '1
define presumption in the mandatory sense in Rule 13 as follows:
"A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of
law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or
group of facts found or otherwise established in the action."
The justification for confining the word "presumption" to the
48. See pages 12-13 supra.
49. See page 17 supra.
50. See page 18 supra.
51. See notes 29-31 supra.
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mandatory presumption is based on the fact that the word is most
frequently used in this context, the instances in which "presump-
tion" has been used to describe other basic fact-presumed fact
relationships having different consequences being of a sporadic
nature which are easily identified and handled.-2 As against this
policy, however, one should compare and consider Professor Mc-
Cormick's suggested permissive-mandatory presumption dich-
otomy.
As stated in the comments to Rule 13, it "embodies in one simple
definition the substance of (1) and (21 of A. L. I. Model Code of
Evidence Rule 701. No separate definition of 'basic fact,'-the fact
or facts from which the presumption is drawn is deemed necessary.'"
The apparent simplicity of the formulation in Rule 13 may be pre-
ferred, but the logic and clarity of the definitions in Model Code
rule 701 ought to be given serious consideration. In Rule 701(1)
"basic fact" is defined as "the fact or group of facts giving rise to a
presumption," and consistently, a presumption is then defined in
Rule 702(2) as meaning "that when a basic fact exists the existence
of another fact must be assumed, whether or not the other fact
may be rationally found from the basic fact."
In Rule 13 of the Uniform Rules, the language "found or other-
wise established" is determinative of the finding of the basic fact.
What does this language mean? In the comment to Rule 13 it is
said that "the establishing of the facts on which the presumption is
based is accomplished in the same manner, by evidence or by judi-
cial notice, or by the pleadings or stipulation as any other fact is
established." Presumably the comment to Rule 13 would shed light
on the interpretation of "found or otherwise established." But would
it not be just as easy, yet more certain if a rule were drafted similar
to Rule 702 of the Model Code which provides that the basic fact
"may be established in an action by the pleadings, or by stipulation
of the parties, or by judicial notice, or by evidence which compels
a finding, or by a finding of the basic fact from the evidence?"
53
Finally, the Uniform Rules continue to recognize a distinction
between the so-called "conclusive presumption" and the mandatory
presumption prescribed in Rule 13, by excluding them from the
operation of Rule 14 dealing with the effect of presumptions. The
extent to which this can rationally be supported is questionable if
you adhere to the notion of Wigmore that there is no such thing
52. See Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245,
250 (1943).
53. See, in this connection, Morgan, Presumptions, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 512, 513 (1956).
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as a conclusive presumption, not to mention the extent to which
it may mislead courts. 4 Illustrative of this is State v. Nomberg"5
where the Supreme Court used "conclusive presumption" as synon-
omous with the mandatory presumption. This aspect of the Uniform
Rules, it is true, would be consistent with existing North Dakota
law. The question is whether it ought to be a part of either.
Adoption of either the Uniform Rule or Model Code rules 701
and 702 would not constitute a major change requiring a substan-
tial revision in existing North Dakota law. On the contrary, we have
observed that Section 31-1103 is perfectly consistent in its definition
of "presumption" with that in either the Uniform Rules or Model
Code. The difficulty arises in connection with the decisions of the
Supreme Court in which the presumption has been used to describe
presumptions of both the permissive and mandatory type, not to
mention the use of the word when dealing with justifiable infer-
ences. By adopting Rule 13, would the so-called "permissive pre-
sumptions" in North Dakota be subject to the provisions of Uniform
Rules- 13 - 16? It seems not. A determination on a case by case basis
would solve most, if not all, problems in the applicability of Rules
13 - 16.
II. THE EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS
Acording to Professor Morgan, there are at least seven different
rules which the courts have applied in determining the effect to be
given to presumptions.5" Of these, the most significant for the pur-
poses of this study are: the so-called Thayerian rule; the Uniform
Rule; the rule that a presumption is evidence; and the Connecticut
rule.
The Thayerian Rule. Thayer's view of the effect of presumptions
was that they placed upon the party against whom they operated
the burden of going forward with the evidence and, failing to do so,
would require a finding of the presumed fact.5 7 Wigmore indorsed
the view as follows:
. * .. the peculiar effect of a presumption . .. is merely to
invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach the conclusion
in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent. If
the opponent does offer [sufficient] evidence to the contrary . .. .
the presumption disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in
the jury's hands free from any rule."
54. Id. at 516.
55. 14 N.D. 291, 103 N.W. 566 (1905).
56. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245, 247-249
(1943).
57. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 336, 339 (1898).
58. 9 Wigmore, Evidence J 2491 (3d ed. 1941).
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To illustrate, assume that the proponent wishes to prove the
receipt of a letter. Through evidence, or judicial notice, or stipula-
tion, it is established that the letter was addressed, stamped and
mailed. Establishment of this basic fact gives rise to the presumed
fact of receipt. Under the Thayerian rule, in the absence of any
evidence that the letter was not received, the court is required to
rule that the letter was received. If, on the other hand, the opponent
introduces the testimony of a witness that the letter was not
received, the presumption disappears and it becomes purely a ques-
tion for the trier of fact as to whether the letter was received. The
jury is free, in addition to the opponent's evidence, to consider the
regularity of the mails as evidence of the fact of receipt, but no
independent probative force is given to the presumption."
In a jurisdiction adhering to the Thayerian rule, directed, as it
is, toward regulating the duty of producing evidence, there is ord-
inarily no need to refer to the presumption in the instructions to
the jury. To illustrate, in Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,"° a
Minnesota case, plaintiff's intestate sued to recover accidental
death benefits under two life insurance policies. The insured had
died about one hour after being found on the ground below the
window of a hospital room where he had been confined with an
incurable throat cancer. The jury returned a verdict for the defend-
ant and the plaintiff appealed contending, inter alia, that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the effect of the pre-
sumption against suicide. The Supreme Court said:
"The function of a presumption, ... is solely to control decis-
ion on a group of unopposed facts. Given death from violence,
without more, decision must be that it was accidental ...
"With us a presumption does not shift the burden of proof
[persuasion] ...
"A presumption may and frequently does shift the burden of
going on with the evidence. That is to say only that it makes a
prima facie case. If the trial stops there, without further evidence
opposing the case so made, there is nothing for the jury. By non-
suit or directed verdict, the judge decides the issue as one of law.
If, however, the prima facie case is met by adequate evidence,
the case goes to the jury with the burden of proof where it was in
the beginning. So the presumption is properly appraised as a mere
59. See, in this connection, Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724
(1935), involving the presumption against suicide, where the court said: "[The judge]
may of course [in his instructions] refer in his discretion to the improbability of suicide
as an inference of fact, based on the common experience of mankind, but the jury should
be permitted to give the inference such weight as it deems best undisturbed by the
thought that the inference has some sort of artificial probative force which must influence
their deliberation."
60. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939).
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'procedural device' for allocation of the burden of going on with
the evidence ...
"It follows that if the case is one for the jurors the presumption
should not be submitted as something to which they may attach
probative force." . . .1
The Uniform Rule. The Thayerian rule is approved by the courts
of many jurisdictions,2 but is has not escaped criticism. Professor
Morgan, in concluding that most presumptions should require a
finding of the presumed fact unless the evidence persuades the trier
of the non-existence of the presumed fact, has argued as follows:
"If a policy is strong enough to call a presumption into exist-
ence, it is hard to imagine it so weak as to be satisfied by the bare
recital of words on the witness stand or the reception in evidence
of a writing. And if the judicial desire for the result expressed in
the presumption is buttressed by either the demands of proced-
ural convenience or is in accord with the usual balance of probab-
ility, it is a little short of ridiculous to allow so valuable a pre-
sumption to be destroyed by the introduction of evidence without
actual persuasive effect. Indeed, the only purpose which the re-
ception of such credible but discredited evidence can ever
accomplish is to demonstrate that in the particular case the prop-
osition that the presumed fact exists is legally disputable, and the
only situation in which such a purpose can furnish a justification
for creating a presumption is where the presumption expresses
a balance of probability not potent enough to overcome the bur-
den which must normally be borne by the litigant seeking to
overcome the inertia of the court."6
3
Consistent with this reasoning, it was proposed that the American
Law Institute adopt a rule which would place on the party against
whom the presumption operates the burden of persuading the trier
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. ' But the Institute rejected
the proposal and adopted the Thayerian rule.1
5
The Uniform Rules, however, reject and adopt, in substance, the
61. Id. at 560.
62. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 316 (1954).
63. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 59, 82 (1933).
64. Model Code of Evidence, proposed rule 904(2): "Subject to Rule 903, when the
basic fact of a presumption has been established in an action and evidence has been in-
troduced which would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact (a) if
the basic fact has no probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the
existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is to be determined exactly as if the pre-
sumption had never been applicable in the action; (b) if the basic fact has any probative
value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, whether or not sufficient to sup-
port a finding of the presumed fact, the party asserting the non-existence of the presumed
fact has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that its non-existence is more probable
than its existence." 18 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 199-200 (1941).
65. Thus, Rule 704 of the Model Code provides: "Subject to Rule 700, when the basic
fact of a presumption has been established in an action and evidence has been introduced
which would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact or the basic fact
of an inconsistent presumption has been established, the existence or non-existence of the
presumed fact is to be determined exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable
in the action." Model Code of Evidence rule 704 (1942).
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rule recommended by Professor Morgan for the Model Code. Uni-
form Rule 14 provides as follows:
"Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are
conclusive or irrefutable under the rules of law from which they
arise, (a) if the facts from which the presumption is derived have
any probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed
fact, the presumption continues to exist and the burden of estab-
lishing the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party
against whom the presumption operates, (b) if the facts from
which the presumption arises have no probative value as evidence
of the presumed fact, the presumption does not exist when evi-
dence is introduced which would support a finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact, and !he fact which would other-
wise be presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly
as if no presumption was or had ever been involved."
The indirect recognition in this rule of the so-called "conclusive"
or "irrefutable" presumption has already been considered. 6 The
rule is stated in two parts, a different effu;ct to be given the presump-
tion depending upon whether the basic fact has any probative value
as evidence of the presumed fact. 67 If it does then the burden is on
the party against whom the presumption operates to persuade (it
is assumed) the trier of fact of the non-existence of the presumed
fact. The justification for the rule is found in the comments to Rule
14 as follows:
" . .. the presumption is a 'working' hypothesis which works
by shifting the burden to the party against whom it operates of
satisfying the jury that the presumed inference is untrue. This
often gives a more satisfactory apportionment of the burden of
persuasion on a particular issue than can be given by the general
rule that the pleader has the burden. One looks rather to the ulti-
mate goal, the case or defense as a whole, the other to a particular
fact-problem within the case."6
The question arises, however, as to what is meant by "burden of
establishing" in Rule 14?69 Are the drafters injecting problems of
interpretation by adopting such phraseology when it is at least
apparent from the comments that the language is intended to mean
burden of persuasion?
If the basic fact does not have any probative value as evidence
then, under Rule 14, when evidence is introduced which would
support a finding of the non-existence ot the presumed fact, then
the case is to be determined as if no presumption had ever been
66. See page 21 supra.
67. Compare Model Code of Evidence, proposed rule 904, supra, note 64.
68. Handbook, Nat'l. Conf. of Com. on Uniform State Laws 172 (1953).
69. See Morgan, Presumptions, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 512, 513 (1956).
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involved in the case. This is, of course, the Thayerian rule.-M Though
the comments to Rule 14 do not contain an explanation of the dis-
tinction between Rule 14(a) and 14(b), it is undoubtedly due to
the same constitutional considerations which led to a similar dis-
tinction in the proposed, but defeated rule for the Model Code.-'
In Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson,7 2 the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia statute which pro-
vided, in effect, that the statutory presumption of negligence of a
railroad company, arising upon proof of damage to person or prop-
erty by railroad equipment, placed upon the company the burden of
persuading the trier of fact of the non-existence of the presumed
fact. The Court said that there was no rational connection between
a collision of a railway train and a vehicle at a highway crossing
(basic fact) and negligence of the company (presumed fact). It
distinguished Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed,'5 involving a
similar statute, on the ground that the kgal effect of the presump-
tion was to impose on the railroad company only the burden of pro-
ducing evidence; that the statute did not infringe due process of
law because the presumption only supplied a presumption of liabil-
ity in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In the Henderson
case the statute gave the presumption the weight of affirmative evi-
dence and since the basic fact that no probative value of the pre-
sumed fact the statute was a denial of due process.74
When Rule 14(a) is applicable it will, of course, be necessary,
through appropriate instructions, to charge the jury to the effect
that it must find according to the presumed fact unless the party
against whom the presumption operates has persuaded it of the non-
existence of the presumed fact. 5 If R~ulc 14(b), or the Thayerian
rule, applies there would be no need to mention the presumption
beyond perhaps telling the jury that they might draw whatever
inferences the basic fact warrants. 76
70. See pages 22-24, supra.
71. See note 64 supra. 18 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 206-207 (1941).
72. 279 U.S. 638 (1929).
73. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
74. But see the comments of Professor Morgan as follows: "Although on the facts it was
demonstrable that the basic fact did have some value in reason as tending to show the
existence of the presumed fact, and although the opinion proceeds on the erroneous as-
sumption that so to fix the burden of persuasion is to make the basic fact evidence of the
presumed fact, still the inadvisability of enacting a provision which the United States Su-
preme Court might make totally ineffective induced the Advisers and Council to seek an-
other solution.
"The Supreme Court had intimated that there would be no objection to a rule .which
caused a presumption to fix the burden of persuasion if the basic fact has a logical value
as evidence of the presumed fact. A rule drawn on this theory was approved by the Ad-
visers and Council, but was rejected .... .. " Am. Law Inst., Model Code of Evidence,
Foreword by Edmund M. Morgan, 60 (1942).
75. See Handbook, Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 172 (1953).
76. See note 58, supra.
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Presumption as Evidence. Some jurisdictions, including North
Dakota, 77 adhere to the view that a presumption is evidence. But
scholars have rejected this concept 8 and most courts are now in
accord. 79 The principal difficulty in viewing a presumption as evi-
dence is the almost insurmountable difficulty it places on the trier
of fact. How can the jury weigh a presumption, which is a com-
pelled inference, (as evidence) against testimonial or documentary
evidence? Professor McBaine, following a penetrating analysis,
comes to the following conclusions:
"Juries can go through the mental process of weighing evi-
dence, that is reasoning from it and arriving at a conclusion
whether a fact exists or does not exist, whether it is probably true
or not, but they cannot possibly determine whether it does or
does not exist by being told that there is a rule of law made for
their guidance to the effect that there is a rebuttable presumption
that the fact exists or a judicial fiat that it probably exists and that
they should (a) weigh the rule of law or (b) reason from an
arbitrary premise that the fact is probably true. To use a common
figure of speech, you cannot place in one scale-pan of the scales
of justice evidence that shows that a fact exists and in the other
scale-pan place a rule of law that the fact is presumed to exist,
absent evidence to the contrary, or a legal fiat that a fact is prob-
ably true, and thereby determine which side outweighs the
other."0
The Connecticut Rule. The foregoing discussion has proceeded
on the assumption that there is but one of several choices to be
made in determining what effect to give a presumption. As against
this background, the Connecticut rule should be mentioned, that is,
the effect of the presumption is to be determined according to the
purposes which it is designed to serve.8 ' Thus, phe presumption of
innocence merely emphasizes the burden of persuasion as resting
on the State in a criminal case;12 the presumption that the insured
has performed all the conditions of the policy on which he is suing
is based only on convenience and, for this reason, when evidence is
introduced it should drop out of the case; similarly, presumptions
based on experience and probability should have the same effect,
such as the presumption of the continuation of life; but where the
77. See pages 29-30, infra.
78. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 339 (1898); 9 Wigmore,
Evidence- § 2491 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So.
Calif L. Rev. 245, 261-264 (1943); McCormick, Law of Evidence 669 (1954).
79. McCormick, op. cit. supra, note 78 at page 669, note 3.
80. McBaine, Presumptions: Are They Evidence, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 517, 548 (1938).
81. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58 170 Atl. 486 (1934).
82. See Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 4 So.2d 887 (1941), stating that the presump-
tion of innocence is not a presumption in the true sense of the word, but only an assump-
tion designed to place burden of persuasion on person asserting a deviation from socially
prescribed norms of conduct.
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presumption arises because evidence of the presumed fact is peculi-
arily within the knowledge of a party, he should also have the bur-
den of persuading the trier of the non-existence of the presumed
fact, for example, the presumption that a motor vehicle is being
operated as a family car.83
Which approach should be adopted: one rule for all presump-
tions; or different rules depending upon the reason for which the
particular presumption was created? Dean Gausewitz has sum-
marized well these competing approaches. He says:
"The one policy is to do actual, concrete, substantial justice in
each individual case; the other policy is to do formal, procedural
justice by having a uniform rule that is easily administered re-
gardless of its effect in the particular case. * * * The first of these
conflicting policies can be called the 'particular justice policy' be-
cause it aims at actual justice in the particular, individual, case.
The other can be called the 'procedural justice policy' because it
aims at an easily understood and administered uniform rule that
will probably result in justice in the average case and also avoid
injustices due to difficulties of administration.""s
While, as Professor Morgan has observed, the most intellectually
satisfying and theoretically sound solution would be to give pre-
sumptions varying effects depending upon the reasons for creating
them, there are significant practical problems in attempting any
such approach. 5 The trial judge could not be expected to apply
such a rule offhand. It might not be readily apparent what reason
gave rise to a particular presumption; even more significant is that
many presumptions are based upon more than one policy consider-
ation and determining which one is predominant to give the pre-
sumption the proper effect could not often be expected to be more
than a mere guess.88 While a pre-determined classification might
solve the trial judge's problems in this respect, is such a classifica-
tion possible? Professor Morgan suggests that it is not. Courts
cannot classify them except by a process of judicial decision which
would take too long and legislatures cannot classify them easily be-
cause of the tremendous effort involved.8 Though views to the
contrary have been expressed,"8 the leading commentators today
appear to agree that there should be basically one rule governing
83. O'Dea v. Amodeo, supra, note 81.
84. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 324, 331 (1952).
85. Morgan, Foreword, in Model Code of Evidence 1, 52 (1942); Morgan, Further
Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245, 250, 253-254 (1943).
86. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245, 253-254
(1943); McCormick, Law of Evidence 668-669 (1954).
87. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245, 253-254
(1943).
88. O'Dea v. Amodeo, supra, note 80; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable PreSumptions of
Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 307, 313 (1920).
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the effect of all presumptions.80 The controversy has then been re-
duced to which one of two rules to adopt; the rule espoused by
Thayer and restated by Wigmore or Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules.
III. The Effect of Presumptions Under North Dakota Law As
Compared to Uniform Rule 14
In General. Section 31-1101 of the Code provides as follows:
"A presumption, unless declared by law to be conclusive, may
be controverted by other direct or indirect evidence but unless
so controverted, the jurors are bound to find according to the
presumption."
As to the effect of presumptions, it will be noted that the statute
reads "may be controverted by other direct or indirect evidence."
[emphasis supplied] In the first place, and without the interpretive
assistance of the Supreme Court, a reading of this language very
clearly indicates that, by the use of the word "other", a presumption
is to be regarded as evidence in North Dakota. A leading case on
the point is Svihovec v. Woodmen Acc. Co.90 The beneficiaries of
an accident policy sued to recover the proceeds, the insurer con-
tending, however, that death was by suicide. At the close of the
beneficiaries' case, both parties rested and the insurer moved for a
directed verdict. The motion was denied and the jury returned a
verdict for the beneficiaries. On appeal, the insurer alleged, as error,
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. In rever-
sing the trial court's refusal to direct averdict for the insurer, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the evidence could not
be reconciled with any reasonable theory of accidental or non-in-
tentional death. In so doing, however, the Court, following an
earlier case,9' said that Section 31-1101, fairly construed, gave to the
presumption against suicide the weight of affirmative evidence and
"that proof of death by gunshot wound, aided by this presumption,
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of accidental death,
and that a verdict founded upon such proof and presumption would
not be set aside unless the facts and circumstances surrounding the
death could not be-reconciled with any reasonable theory of acci-
dental on [sic] nonintentional injury."2 Whatever might be the
wisdom of giving a presumption the effect of evidence (and it has
been suggested that it is ill-advised ),- there is little doubt that this
89. Gausewitz, supra note 84 at 331.
90. 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939).
91. Stevens v. Continental Casualty Co., 12 N.D. 463, 97 N.W. 862 (1903).
92. See note 90 supra at 449.
93. See page 27 supra.
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is the rule embodied in Section 31-1101. But it is also equally clear
that Uniform Rule 14 does not so provide. 4
Does Section 31-1101 give any other effect to presumptions, for
example, shift the burden of presumption to the opponent, as in
Uniform Rule 14? It is not an easy task to make such a determina-
tion, 5 but the Svihovec case, together with a more recent decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 6 indicate that the
statute gives to a presumption the effect of shifting the burden of
persuasion to the person against whom the presumption operates.
The statute uses language which, in effect, says that jurors are
bound to find according to the presumption unless controverted by
other evidence. The meaning of "controverted" in the statute is not
clear; it might mean anything, though perhaps a strong argument
can be made that controvert is to overcome in the persuasive sense.
On analysis, the Svihovec case is of more assistance. Recall that
there the suit was on a policy insuring against accidental death.
The rule is that the burden of persuasion as to accidental death
rests on the plaintiff.97  In the Svihovec case, the Supreme Court
did not speak in terms of Section 31-1101 calling for a shifting of the-
burden of persuasion. But it did unequivocally state that the pre-
sumption established a prima facie case (in the mandatory sense)
of accidental death. Further, the Court asserted "that the burden
was upon the defendant to establish that the death of the insured
was due to his suicide or the intentional act of another person."
Though, as heretofore noted, the word "establish" is ambiguous,
98
the foregoing factors lead to the reasonable conclusion that Section
31-110i also gives to presumptions the effect of shifting the burden
of persuasion. In any event, this is the conclusion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the recent case of Dick v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.99 To this extent then, we can find basic agree-
ment in the law of North Dakota and the proposed Uniform Rule 14.
One might suppose that Section 31-1101, as interpreted, is exclu-
sive so far as the effect of presumptions in North Dakota is con-
cerned. Such is very clearly not the case. Section 36-2112 of the
Code provides:
I
94. See the comments to Uniform Rule 1(1) defining evidence as "the means from
which inferences may be drawn as a basis of proof in duly constituted judicial or fact-
finding tribunals, and includes testimony in the form of opinion and hearsay." The drafters
say that this definition is consistent, inter alia, with the principle that presumptions are not
evidence. Handbook, Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 165 (1953).
95. See Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 245, 249
(1943).
96. Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 79 S.Ct. 921 (1959).
97. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 12141 (1947).
98. See page 21 supra.
99. See note 96 supra.
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"the killing or damaging of any livestock by a railroad car or
locomotive shall be prima facie evidence of carelessness and neg-
ligence on the part of the railway company or corporation."
As elsewhere noted, this statute has been construed by the Su-
preme Court as creating a mandatory presumption."' This pre-
sumption of negligence has been construed in a line of decisions as
having the effect of only shifting the burden of producing evidence
to the opponent and, 101 if evidence of negligence is introduced it
"clear[s] away and suspend[s] all presumptions."12 So construed
the rule governing the effect of this statutory presumption is the
straight Thayerian rule.105  In one case, there was an extremely
strong dissent in which the judge argued most strongly for what, in
effect, would be to give the statutory presumption the effect of
shifting the burden of persuasion to the opponent.'04 But the
opinion had no effect on later cases on point in which the court has
adhered to the Thayerian rule.
So interpreted, the presumtion of the statute need not necessarily
be regarded as conflicting with Uniform Rule 14. It may very well
be nothing more than illustrative of that class of cases in which the
basic facts have no probative value of the presumed fact and would
fall within Uniform 14(a). As such, the statutory presumption in
question may also be illustrative of the type in which the burden of
persuasion, for constitutional reasons, could not be shifted to the
opponent in view of Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson.1 5
Apparently no case concerning Section 36-2112 on this point has
been before the courts.
This apparent harmony is shattered by at least two decisions of
the Supreme Court."0 6 Plaintiff sued to recover workmen's com-
pensation for the death of her husband while allegedly in the
employment of a lumber company. To sustain the contention that
he was. an employee within the meaning of the Act, plaintiff relied
on Section 65-0103 of the Code providing that "where one performs
service for another for remuneration, whether the saie is paid as a
100. See page 18 supra.
101. Snyder v. Northern Pac. By., Co. 69 N.D. 266, 285 N.W. 450 (1939); Stoeber v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 40 N.D. 121, 168 N.W. 562 (1918); Reinke v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 23 N.D. 182, 135 N.W. 779 (1912); Clair v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 22 N.D. 120, 132 N.W. 776 (1911); Corbett v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 19 N.D. 450, 125 N.W. 1054 (1910); Wright v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M.
Ry. Co., 12 N.D. 159, 96 N.W. 324 (1903); Hodgins v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M.
By. Co., 3 N.D. 382, 56 N.W. 139 (1893).
102. Stoeber v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., supra, note 101.
103. See page 22 supra.
104. See the opinion of Justice Grace in Stoeber v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry.
Co., supra note 101 at pages 564-565.
105. 279 U.S. 639 (1929), discussed at page 26 supra.
106. Starkenberg v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 73 N.D. 234, 13
N.W.2d 395 (1944).
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salary, commission or otherwise, the person performing such ser-
vice is presumed to be an employee of the person for whom the
services are performed until the contrary is shown."o7 The Court
said:
"When cvidence has been introduced as to the agreement under
which the employment is performed, and the respective obliga-
tions of the parties thereunder, the presumption has spent its
force and the evidence is controlling. 'Presumptions are indulged
to supply the place of facts; they are never allowed against ascer-
tained and established facts. When these appear, presumptions
disappear.' ""o
Clearly, the Court is applying the Thayerian rule to this statutory
presumption. Yet it clearly seems to be one in which the basic fact
has probative value of the presumed fact, in which event, under
Uniform Rule 14, the burden of persuasion would shift to the
opponent.
Again, in the recent case of Johnson v. Johnson,'"' the Supreme
Court has applied the Thayerian rule in ruling on the effect of the
statutory presumpton "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as. husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of mar-
riage.' ' ""ab Without citing or considering Section 31-1101, supra, or
the Court's interpretation of that statute in the Svihovec case, supra,
the Supreme Court concluded, as in the Starkenberg case, supra,
that a presumption is not evidence and its only effect is to place on
the party against whom it operates the burden of going forward
with the evidence. If the party comes forward with evidence, the
presumption disappears and the case is decided as if no presumption
had ever been involved. Rightly, I believe, the court rejects the
notion that a presumption is evidence, though the question remains
whether it can consistently so rule in the face of Section 31-1101,
supra. As to whether the presumption should have the effect of only
requiring evidence form the opponent, or whether it should place
the burden of persuasion on him, is another question. That the basic
fact of the presumption involved in the Johnson case has probative
value of the presumed fact seems clear enough; a situation in which
Uniform Rule 14 would require placing the burden of persuasion on
the opponent. Hence, the decision seems clearly inconsistent with
the result which would be reached under this Rule. For immediate
purposes, the Johnson decision insofar as it conflicts with the Sviho-
107. The statute has since been amended, but the amendment does not alter the decis-
ion in the Starkenberg case, supra, note 105 on the effect of the presumption. See N.D.
Laws c. 375, § 2 (1947), now found in N.D. Rev. Code § 65-0103 (Supp. 1957).
108. See note 106 supra at 398.
108a. 104 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1960).
108b. N.D. Rev. Code Sec. 31-1103, subd. 30 (1943).
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vec case, adds further confusion to an already confused state of the
law on the effect of presumptions in North Dakota; an area badly in
need of clarification, whether by way of legislative revision or judi-
cial decision.
The Presumption of Legitimacy. Notwithstanding the contro-
versy among courts and writers on whether presumptions generally
should have the effect of placing the burden of persuasion to the
opponent, there is agreement that this should be so in the case of
the presumption of legitimacy.""5 Furthermore, the extent of the
burden of persuasion required is at least by clear and convincing
evidence (highly probably true) and some even require the degree
of proof applicable to criminal cases - beyond a reasonable
doubt.11 Accordingly, when the Model Code was drafted a special
rule was incorporated requiring the placing of the burden of per-
suasion in the case of the presumption of legitimacy.1 Also, the
degree of proof required by the rule is beyond a reasonable
doubt, 1 '- rather than proof by clear and convincing evidence on the
theory that this intermediate degree of proof would be difficult to
apply in practice.1 ' The special rule is based, of course, on strong
reasons of policy which require that a child born during wedlock
should be treated as legitimate except upon the clearest showing
that it is not.
The theory behind the general rule and the rule of the Model
Code supports the similar rule in the Uniform Rules, except that the
Rule is stated in broader terms to give it general application to pre-
sumptions other than just the presumption of legitimacy. Further-
more, it deals only with the degree of belief necessary since, as
noted, the Uniform Rules, unlike the Model Code, reject the Thayer-
ian rule of the effect of presumptions. Rule 16 provides as follows:
"A presumption, which by a rule of law may be overcome only
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or by clear and convincing
evidence, shall not be affected by Rules 14 and 15 and the burden
of proof to overcome it continues on the party against whom the
presumption operates."
The degree of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy has never been drawn in question in North Dakota."14  How-
109. McCormick, Law of Evidence 646 (1954).
110. Id. at 646-647.
111. Model Code of Evidence rule 703 (1942) provides: "Whenever it is established in
an action that a child was born to a woman while she was the lawful wife of a specified
man, the party asserting the illegitimacy of the child has the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuading the trier of fact beyond reasonable doubt that the man was
not the father of the child."
112. Ibid.
113. See the comments to Model Code of Evidence, page 313 (1942).
114. See N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0901 (1943) providing: "All children born in wedlock are
1961]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ever, since the Rule does not, by its terms, expressly apply to the
presumption of legitimacy, North Dakota is not bound to adopt
what is the rule elsewhere governing the effect of the presumption.
It is doubtful, however, that it would reach any other result than
require the party against whom the presumption operates to at least
persuade the jury that the presumed fact is highly probably untrue.
The more general form of Uniform Rule 16 is preferable to the
Model Code rule since the North Dakota Court has held, as to pre-
sumptions other than legitimacy, that a higher degree of proof than
ordinarily required is necessary to rebut the presumed fact. In State
v. Crum,1 5 the Court held that the presumption that a warranty
deed, absolute on its face, is an unconditional conveyance, must be
rebutted by clear, satisfactory and specific proof, which probably
means "highly probably true."l 1a
IV. Inconsistent Presumptions
Rule 15 of the Uniform Rules provides:
"If two presumptions arise which are conflicting with each
other the judge shall apply the presumption which is founded on
the weightier considerations of policy and logic. If there is no
such preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded."
W married H in 1916. H disappeared in 1923. In 1928 W mar-
ried D. D received fatal injuries in his employment in 1934 and W
sued for compensation. Is W the widow of D?11 W gets the bene-
fit of a presumption of the validity of the marriage with D. The op-
ponent gets the benefit of the presumption of the continuance of the
marriage relationship. Which prevails as between these conflicting
presumptions? Here, the courts, contrary to Thayer's insistence
that the presumptions cancel one another,", hold that the stronger
presumption prevails. Since the presumption of the validity of the
marriage is based on the strong social policy in favor of family sta-
bility and legitimacy it outweighs the presumption of the continu-
ance of the marriage relationship which is based chiefly on prob-
ability and trial convenience. 119 Under these circumstances, W
would get the benefit of the presumption of the validity of her mar-
riage with D and, under the Uniform Rules, the opponent would
have the burden of persuading the jury of the non-existence of the
presumed to be legitimate." See also, State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1945) and
State v. Fury, 53 N.D. 33, 205 N.W. 877 (1925), both involving the question of who
can rebut the presumtion of legitimacy under Section 14-0903 of the Code, both holding
that the husband or wife are competent under the statute.
115. 70 N.D. 177, 292 N.W. 392 (1940).
116. See Whinery, supra note 1 at 214-215.
117. See Sillart v. Standard Screen Company, 119 N.J.L. 143, 194 AtI. 787 (1937).
118. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence 346 (1898).
119. See McCormick, Law of Evidence 653 (1954).
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presumed fact. This is the result called for under Uniform Rule 15
which is in accord with the law of North Dakota."
If, on the other hand, the presumptions are of the same type or
based on the same considerations of policy, then under Rule 15 the
presumptions would be disregarded and the basic facts of the pre-
sumptions would merely be considered, along with other evidence,
as circumstantial evidence of the fact in issue. There appear to be
no authorities on the point in North Dakota, but courts have so
held elsewhere and the result seems reasonable.'
2 '
V. Conclusion to Burden of Proof and Presumptions
One might suppose that the purpose of this section is to bring to-
gether in a concise, orderly, and harmonious fashion the analysis of
Burden of Proof appearing in volume 33 of the Review and the fore-
going analysis of presumptions and their relationship to burden of
proof. Even if it were possible to do so in such a troubled area -
if the black letter of the appellate decisions is any indication -it
would involve hardly more than a reiteration.
It can perhaps be said that adoption of the Uniform Rules relat-
ing to burden of proof and presumptions would not represent a
drastic departure, from what appears to be the existing condition of
the law in North Dakota. The most bothersome problem is in de-
finition. The Uniform Rules confine the word presumption - as
does North Daokta ostensibly by statute - to a provisionally man-
datory assumption of the existence of the presumed fact. In appli-
cation the word has not been so confined. But, as suggested in the
text, perhaps the situations in which the word presumption has been
otherwise used are sufficiently isolated to enable the courts, to de-
termine when the provisions of the Uniform Rules would be appli-
cable.
The wisdom of continued recognition of the so-called "conclusive
presumption" in the Uniform Rules is debatable, but if the situations
in which it is used are clearly indicated it may be justifiably re-
tained because of its recognized usage. It would also avoid coping
with the repeal of Section 31-1102 of the Code and any other stat-
utes creating these rules of law denominated "conclusive presump-
tions."
120. Holtan v. Beck, 20 N.D. 5, 125 N.W. 1048 (1910), holding that the presumption
that a person has not committed an unlawful act outweighs the presumption that a thing
once shown to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature; and Salzer
Lumber Co. v. Claflin, 16 N.D. 601, 113 N.W. 1036 (1907), holding that the presump-
tion that an affidavit is sworn to in the county named in its caption is overcome by the
presumption that an officers acts are performed at the county where he is legally authorized
to act.
121. See McCormick, Law of Evidence 653 (1954).
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As to the effect to be given presumptions (as defined in Uniform
Rule 13), adoption of Rule 14 would clearly result in a rejection of
the existing statutory rule in North Dakota that a presumption is
evidence, but for the reasons given, it would effect a desirable
change. We have also seen a general conformity of the North Da-
kota law to the distinction made in Uniform Rules 14(a) and 14(b)
in the different effect to be given presumptions depending on
whether the basic fact has any probative value of the presumed fact.
Two cases have been noted where the Supreme Court may have
gone astray in applying the Thayerian rule when, certainly in view
of Section 31-1101, as interpreted, the presumption should have
placed the burden of persuasion. With the qualifications to be noted
hereafter, Rule 14 would certainly constitute a better reasoned,
more articulate, approach than we now find in the existing statutory
scheme.
If, however, we were to retain some measure of consistency in
terminology, meaning and interpretation, consideration should be
given to the following suggestions for changes in the Uniform Rules:
(1) Proof in Uniform Rule 1(3) should be defined as follows:
"Proof is the cumulative effect of all of the evidence relevant
to a fact in issue which persuades the trier of fact of the existence
or non-existence of such fact."
(2) The term "burden of persuasion" should be inserted in Uni-
form Rule 1(4) in lieu of "burden of proof" and the parenthetical
statement "burden of proof is synonomous with 'burden of persuas-
ion"' be deleted. Also, some consideration should be given to Pro-
fessor MeBaine's proposal to define "preponderance of the evi-
dence," "clear and convincing evidence" and "beyond a reasonable
doubt" in Uniform Rule 1(4) in terms of degrees of belief.
(3) Consideration should also be given to modifying Uniform
Rule 1(5) to incorporate the test for determining when the burden
of producing evidence has been met, such as was done in Model
Code rule 1(2).
(4) While the definition of presumption in Uniform Rule 13
would perhaps suffice, serious consideration should be given to the
formulations in Model Code rules 701 and 702.
(5) Finally, it seems most essential that the terminology "burden
of persuasion of" be substituted for "burden of establishing" in Uni-
form Rule 14(a).
Adoption of Uniform Rules 13-16 with the recommended changes
would necessitate a repeal of Section 31-1101 of the Code pertaining
to the effect of presumptions and the first paragraph of Section 31-
1103 defining "disputable presumption." With the foregoing changes
it! would be naive to assume that adoption of the Rules would solve
all the problems. Perhaps, however, it would constitute a useful
step in clarifying a troublesome area of the law in North Dakota.
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